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Turning a blind eye: the complicit trespassing of ‘Chinese walls’ in financial institutions 






This article examines the ways in which ‘Chinese walls’ – that is, information barriers within 
financial institutions – are constituted and subverted by acts of trespass within large 
investment banking firms in New York. While Chinese walls positively serve to prevent 
corruption and fraud, they simultaneously entice legal, semi-legal and illegal forms of 
trespassing. My analysis shows that some trespassing is based on non-verbalised and 
embodied exchanges of information that are not in and of themselves illegal. Referred to as 
playing ‘the game’, the result of these forms of trespass is that the Chinese wall becomes an 
‘effect’ or fiction. At other times, trespassing can cause inconvenient suspicion, encouraging 
those who operate amidst these walls to participate strategically in various aspects of willful 
blindness. Together, these examples reveal the conceptual and material relationships between 
‘seeing’ and ‘knowing’, thereby highlighting the complexity of information flows in financial 
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‘Walls’ have a long history on Wall Street. They are part of the regulative ideals of wanting to 
wall people off from each other, and sequestering information for both protective and 
exploitative purposes. The Wall Street term ‘Chinese wall’, ostensibly inspired by the Great 
Wall of China, was popularized following the 1929 stock-market crash. Chinese walls were 
institutionalised with the 1933 Banking Act, commonly referred to as the Glass–Steagall Act, 
which was introduced to regulate relations between commercial and investment banking, and 
the speculative practices of the latter. The restrictions imposed by the act aimed to ensure the 
transparency of financial statements and prevent fraudulent activities in the financial 
securities markets in order to protect against potential misrepresentation and ‘insider trading’.  
The purpose of Chinese walls is thus relatively straightforward. They are barriers 
erected to limit conflicts of interest between corporate finance (particularly corporate-client 
confidentiality), brokering divisions (where salaries are mostly based on commissions and 
fees) that trade public debt and equity shares, and the research analysts who report on such 
financial instruments. The Chinese wall, operationally referred to in the singular yet 
practically existing in the plural, separates investment bankers from analysts and other non-
brokerage activities, and aims to prevent the leaking of information between them. Because 
Chinese walls represent, at heart, the willful agreement of employees not to share knowledge, 
one could say they are an institutionalised and ethical form of willful blindness. Indeed, 
Chinese walls are sometimes referred to as ‘ethical walls’ and they are maintained through 
ethics codes and guidelines. As such, they serve a legitimate and critical function, and they 
mostly work as they should.  
My research among investment bankers in New York suggests, however, that this 
straightforward depiction of Chinese walls fails to consider the various subtle ways in which 
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information can travel across walls.1 As will be discussed later, Chinese walls can be crossed 
legitimately, and protocols exist for doing so when expertise needs to be shared across 
divisions. These walls can also be crossed illegitimately, in which case trespassers risk being 
criminally charged with insider trading. However, there is another, third way, of crossing 
walls, which is neither legal nor illegal. This way of crossing Chinese walls entails gaining 
knowledge of another domain without receiving visual confirmation. The absence of positive 
confirmation makes it impossible to prove that trespassing has taken place. Whilst this form 
of trespass goes against the principles of Chinese walls, it is not in itself illegal – or at least 
cannot be proven to be illegal. As I will show, knowledge of this form of ‘legal trespass’ is 
widespread and considered legitimate – at least as long as it does not produce any financial 
losses. The tacit and explicit knowledge of how to trespass Chinese walls legally is an 
important part of what is referred to as ‘playing the game’. In my main field site, many 
individuals appeared to have at least some knowledge that could have resulted in exposing 
other individuals – or the units that they work in – to accusations of financial deception. 
However, they deliberately ignore these inconvenient truths. Here, ‘not seeing’ is a strategy 
that individuals adopt when making decisions about how to proceed with their work, their 
jobs and their careers.  Along with the knowledge of how to trespass Chinese walls, ‘turning a 
blind eye’ to certain forms of trespassing is also part of ‘playing the game’.2 
 In these financial institutions, two different forms of willful blindness thus interact. 
The Chinese walls themselves are legitimate and ethical forms of willfuly agreeing not to 
share knowledge between financial divisions, but this form of ignorance is counteracted by 
the deliberate yet implicit rules of ‘the game’, which includes ignoring ‘tacit’ trespassing as 
long as it does not produce financial loss for the company. In the process, a particular form 
of willful blindness emerges that is enabled because knowledge is only considered to be 
‘gained’ once there is positive confirmation. Practises of ‘the game’ show how relationships 
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between knowledge and visibility in finance can be instrumentalised to both abide and 
circumvent regulations through performances of seeing and not seeing. 
Chinese walls offer a counter-example of what Gillian Tett refers to as the silo 
problem: the structural, social, and cognitive fragmentation of financial knowledge in ways 
that undermine the stability of financial markets (2010, 2015). Such fragmentation can 
obviously be problematic, but here I show how Chinese walls can create the illusion of silos 
while, in effect, they might also conceal unofficial coordinated efforts between finance 
divisions that are legally intended to be kept separate. In such cases Chinese walls can be 
utilised as props to stage silos in acts of ‘performing the economy’ (Callon, 1998: 23). In 
this way, ‘the game’ can uphold the ‘mystique of finance’ (Riles, 2011) in terms of 
appearances and choices of not seeing, thereby encouraging the Bourdieuian ‘social silences’ 
(Tett, 2010:122) that underpin financial markets.  
Before discussing ‘the game’ as a legal willful blindness that goes against the principle 
of Chinese walls, I will outline how Chinese walls are constituted, their purpose and how they 
are crossed legally and illegally providing instances in which finance and visibility might 
work together to challenge a regulatory framework. 
 
 
Chinese walls: virtual and physical information barriers  
 
The Glass–Steagall Act of 1933, which instituted Chinese walls in the United States, was 
repealed in 1999. Nevertheless, Chinese walls and the distinction that they aim to enforce 
between private and public aspects of financial institutions have been buoyed by other 
legislation. This includes the Sarbanes–Oxley Act 2002, the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act 2010. The latter was put into effect by former US president 
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Barack Obama in direct response to the 2008 global financial crisis. Prominent economists 
such as the Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz (2010) have argued that repealing Glass–Steagall 
was a main contributor to the crisis, and that ‘tearing down the walls’ (Stiglitz, 2009: 48) 
alongside lax regulation (mostly concerning derivatives) effectively left conflicts of interest 
unchecked. Others, however, suggest that the global financial crisis was caused by activities 
that would not have been stopped by the repealed measures anyway (Pozen, 2009).  
Chinese walls are imposed boundaries that necessarily compensate for the fact that 
government legislation does not explicitly prohibit companies from engaging in multiple, 
conflicting types of business under the same roof. Investment banks have been instituting 
virtual Chinese walls on a voluntary and ad hoc basis for nearly 90 years. Any acts of trespass 
undermining them were only noted when they resulted in litigation. With the passing of the 
Global Analyst Research Settlement Act 2003, financial institutions were required to erect 
physical Chinese walls to separate analysts from investment bankers, producing ‘completely 
separate reporting lines, separate legal and compliance staffs, and separate budgeting 
processes’ (SEC, 2003, para. 9). Among its many proscriptions, the Act furthermore states 
that ‘analyst compensation cannot be based directly or indirectly upon investment banking 
revenues or input from investment banking personnel’ (SEC, 2003, para 10). This convenient 
fiction – that the analyst’s success could be fully divorced from the firm’s monetary success 
in all other divisions – is key to overall ideas about ‘the game’, the non-verbalised 
understanding of how financial institutions operate, as I will detail later. 
Chinese walls within investment banks, as well as being legally required, are socially, 
morally, politically and economically constituted and sustained. In order to appreciate where 
Chinese walls are erected, the full range of investment banking activities need to be 
considered alongside the fact that different financial institutions define their own activities 
differently. All investment banks raise capital for companies and advise them on financing, 
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mergers, acquisitions, restructuring, recapitalization or liquidating assets; in addition, they 
may sell securities to investors as a way of raising capital that is then traded in global 
financial markets. These banks also have research departments, whose analysts issue reports 
on specific debt and equity instruments and markets. Indeed, it is between investment banking 
and research that the Chinese wall takes its most visible form, blocking information flows 
between investment bankers and researchers. As a result, analysts cannot encourage the public 
to trade in stocks about which the investment bank has insider information. 
Physical Chinese walls vary in space, arrangement, location and dimension depending 
on the size and organization of a firm. In larger firms, the investment and research arms might 
be on separate floors, and analysts and investment bankers may even have exclusive elevators 
so as to limit potential interaction. In many smaller firms, they are isolated from one another 
by an internal wall, with passage between the two sides requiring a special electronic pass. In 
this way individuals are positioned vis-à-vis the wall and their ability to access specific areas. 
In a sense, Chinese walls shape their workplace personhood. 
Although my fieldwork consists of working in several different financial institutions, 
here I mostly draw on material regarding one New York firm, which publicly presents itself 
as focused on investment banking, equities, debt, asset management and wealth management, 
and which has four main arms: investment banking, capital markets, research and institutional 
sales (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. The Chinese wall: Physical office access between investment banking divisions, field site 
(Author). 
 
Walls can move, and there are multiple walls that shift in accordance to context. Walls 
can also be surmounted by some but not others. Furthermore walls extend beyond the 
workplace – an issue I take up in the next section. Figure 1 shows the rules restricting 
employee workplace mobility. First, some employees have greater access to other arms of the 
bank than other employees. Thus investment bankers may enter capital markets and 
institutional sales, but capital markets and institutional salespeople cannot, in turn, access the 
investment banking unit. Second, access to some arms of the bank, while usually forbidden, 
can be obtained when regulated by the compliance department. Research analysts can obtain 
compliance-regulated access to capital markets and institutional sales, for example. Third, 
some walls are more permeable than others. Thus, while it is relatively simple for research 
analysts to gain regulated access to institutional sales, exchanges between research analysts 
and investment bankers are the most regulated of all. Finally, (and this is not captured by the 
diagram), there are various circumstances under which individuals ‘jump’ or are ‘brought 
over the wall’.  
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‘Across’, ‘above’ and/or ‘over’ the wall: legitimate forms of crossing Chinese walls 
Any individual who has the ability to move freely throughout the workplace having access to 
other actors and divisions, is ‘over the wall’. Some individuals are always, or mostly, ‘over 
the wall’, while others need to be ‘brought over the wall’ when their expertise is needed. 
There are also employees – typically senior managers, internal auditors, corporate security 
and legal, compliance and risk managers – who routinely have knowledge of all sides of the 
wall and are thus ‘above the wall’. People ‘above the wall’ may have access to privileged 
information from different sides of the wall, but they are precluded from giving advice on 
client transactions unless a senior compliance officer approves this. All stakeholders may 
have legitimate and legal reasons and justifications for being ‘over the wall’ – but only in 
specific circumstances. Regulations regarding information barriers emphasize research 
analysts’ conflicts of interest while limiting the shifting roles that other workplace 
stakeholders have regarding confidential information, particularly investment bankers, 
brokers and institutional salespeople. In addition, the compliance department, of crucial 
importance since a compliance officer must physically accompany anyone inside the firm 
who is ‘brought over the wall’.3  
There are ordinary and extraordinary frameworks concerning activities that require 
someone to be ‘brought over the wall’, some being routine and others requiring more explicit 
approval. For example, when an investment banker approaches a corporation to propose that 
they do a financial offering for them, the research analyst is ‘across the wall’ – that is, she or 
he does not have knowledge of the potential offering. If, hypothetically, the investment 
banker succeeds at ‘getting an offering’ or ‘a deal’ such as a secondary offering,4 then until 
news of it becomes public it is an investment-banking secret.5 However, in a limited number 
of circumstances, investment bankers can bring persons ‘over the wall’ to share in their secret: 
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research analysts, traders or salespersons maybe brought in to provide information or advice 
on very specific issues. Once this happens, all individuals ‘over the wall’ are referred to as the 
‘deal team’. It is also possible that the banker might need specific information from the 
research department, on a ‘need to know’ basis only, and in such cases the head of investment 
banking and the chief compliance officer decide whether it is necessary to contact research 
and how this will be sanctioned. Once ‘over the wall’, a person cannot discuss any relevant 
information with anyone who is not on the deal team, nor act on the information in any public 
or personal capacity. Once the secondary offering is announced publicly, the placement of 
shares is executed by capital markets salespersons. 
Another situation in which people are brought ‘over the wall’ is when the bank 
involves people outside the firm in a confidentially marketed public offering (CMPO). These 
offerings raise money for a company with little public notice so as to minimize potential 
negative effects on the company’s share value. Because a CMPO needs to be placed quickly 
and confidentially, investment bankers take capital markets salespersons ‘over the wall’; these 
salespersons are then permitted to approach targeted investors, normally fund managers, and 
likewise to ‘take them over the wall’.6 One of my interlocutors explained a CMPO as follows: 
 
If we have inside information – and we are hoping to be doing a deal with them [the 
company doing the offering] tonight – then I am calling you, a fund manager. I say: 
‘This is the capital markets desk at XYZ. We want you to participate in a CMPO – if I 
give you the name, do you agree to be “taken over the wall”?’ The fund manager says, 
‘Yes, take me over the wall’. Once he says ‘yes’, then I tell him the name of the 
company, and at that moment he is ‘over the wall’, in possession of confidential 
information and has agreed not to trade the stock or disclose any information. 
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Thus, with their agreement, the fund manager is legally taken ‘over the wall’, and they 
become an insider, part of the deal team, regardless of whether or not they participate in the 
deal. 
 
‘Jumping the wall’: Breaching walls and trespassing 
At my main field site, the wall between investment banking and research is absolute: each 
division is treated as a fortress and separated by some distance so that investment bankers and 
analysts are, in effect, quarantined from each other. Such compliance with the Global Analyst 
Research Settlement Act 2003 ensures that research analysts do not influence their firm’s 
investment banking departments through, for example, the artificial recommendation of stock. 
While such a breach of the Chinese wall between investment and research is potentially 
lucrative financially for the firm, it could also yield disastrous results, as the following 
examples illustrate. 
The Merrill Lynch analyst Henry Blodget, for example, made exceedingly optimistic 
recommendations about dot.com stocks designed to benefit his firm’s investment banking 
business and their clientele companies. This was despite the fact that he was referring to these 
companies derogatorily in personal conversations and e-mails (Campbell, 2001; Cassidy, 
2003), thus trespassing the Chinese wall between research and investment banking. In another 
instance, Jack Grubman, a telecom specialist at Salomon Smith Barney, intentionally 
concealed material facts in his reports so as to tout stocks that would benefit his firm. He did 
this, he stated, so that he could pay for the private education of his three children (Fisch, 
2006). Fraudulent research is a criminal offence, and in these cases the analysts were fined, 
sentenced and barred from the securities industry. Furthermore, the courts viewed the fall in 
value of the stocks they touted as directly resulting from their being inflated and overvalued 
by the analysts’ research. 
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Trespassing the wall illegally is an extraordinary occurrence, whereas crossing it 
legally is not. The most common, ‘ordinary’ trespasses – acts which, it should be borne in 
mind, are non-quotidian. As I mentioned earlier regarding Figure 1, the limits on interaction 
entailed by Chinese walls can extend beyond the workplace. Besides phone calls and internet 
communication, these restrictions also include meeting those ‘outside the wall’ outside the 
workplace.7 While many Chinese wall trespasses occur outside the workplace, my research 
focuses on the most ordinary yet prevalent transgressions. A typical example of trespass 
might involve sell-side research analysts, meant to conduct independent proprietary research 
reports commonly referred to as ‘coverage’, who recommend the purchase of stocks to 
purposely create benefits for other divisions of the investment banking firm they work for, 
divisions beyond the wall.8 On these occasions the analysts might craft reports for stocks 
whose companies are clients or prospective clients of the investment bank, and 
simultaneously possess inside (non-public) information on these companies that should 
remain secure on their side of the wall. Large investment banks provide ‘coverage’ to their 
financial clients (that is, investment portfolio managers) as a service, thus providing them 
with information for their potential investment decisions; in turn, this generates income in the 
form of commissions for the institutional sales division of the bank. 
 
One investment banking interlocutor, discussing the conflict between writing positive 
research reports and the investment bank’s interest in such reports, echoed what several others 
consistently told me, ‘If 500 of our clients own the stock then we should cover it. It is clear 
that the company is our client. It is clear that we have a vested interest but this should not 
mean that we should not provide that service’. When I asked him if clients take the research 
seriously, given that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the independent 
government agency that enforces securities law, warns customers to be wary of analyst 
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reports that cover their own firm’s clients (SEC, 2010), he laughed and said ‘probably not!’ 
He explained:  
 
The bottom line is that it doesn’t matter! The investors don’t read the research report! 
You read the thing – and so what? You know what it does? The retail salesperson on 
the phone recommended stock Z. He has the comfort to know that the firm is 
recommending it. If the stock collapses or he gets sued or arbitration comes in because 
an investor lost all their money, then he can say, ‘Look, the firm recommended it’. 
That is what it matters for. 
 
The above statement asserts that research reports can protect portfolio managers from 
being blamed for bad financial decisions. Having previously worked in investment banking at 
a time when Chinese walls did not exist physically, I knew that this was only part of the story. 
Investment banks are in the knowledge business and analyst reports leverage their expertise as 
in-house capital and enhance their reputation. A salesperson described how research reports 
generate business at the trading desk through ‘soft dollars’ (payments through commission 
revenue rather than through client fees) and alludes to how research is part of an overall 
package with multiple users:  
 
If there is a fund manager at XY [a mutual fund], that owns Z [a particular stock] and 
one of our institutional salesmen sends out our report to him, the fund manager will 
throw business the salesman’s way. The fund manager then has more comfort – 
[simply because] the stock that he put his firm’s money into has one more analyst 
recommending it. So if the stock collapsed and the big boss says, ‘Why are you buying 
Z?’, he would say, ‘Well, look, five banks all had buy recommendations on the stock’. 
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Just for me sending the research report out, they give you back some business. That 
still happens because it protects the funds manager – he likes to know. He’ll figure out 
that the research report is worth 20k to him. So he’ll tell his rep to send 20k worth of 
trades toward me in soft dollars … I may get a trade worth 1k one day and then the 
next until it adds up to 20k. We are paid back with commission business. 
 
Several times at my field site fund managers also made legitimate calls to research 
analysts wanting to know their opinion because of the analysts’ speciality in a particular 
industry. In fact, many interlocutors emphasize that analysts who are ‘true specialists’, 
particularly those that formerly worked in the industries they now cover, are ‘the best analysts 
and not just someone on Wall Street dressing up the stock!’: 
 
If XY took our capital market’s guy to lunch and said, ‘I need research on this 
company’, they could ask our firm to cover it. They just can’t ask [investment] 
banking. It’s just not the banker. It’s only the wall between the banker and the research, 
not [between] the salesman and the research, that matters in this case. 
 
The permeability of the wall between salespeople and research allows salespeople to take the 
analyst to a meeting to help pitch the stock to a potential customer. One could reasonably 
speculate that this might provide an opportunity for the individuals concerned to speak to each 
other. As one analyst explained:  
 
The salesman can be at the road show9 with the analyst (stated with a tone of disbelief 
and humour). This is because the salesman goes to XY and says, ‘I want you to buy 
Z’; XY has questions for him, and so the analyst is there to answer for him. But I [the 
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analyst] only talk to the company – I only to talk to XY, I can never talk to the fund 
manager [outside of that context] … If I go on a road show when we are doing a deal, 
I’ll be in the room when XY is pitching ... and I can maybe throw in a few words – but 
almost always the management gives the presentation. 
 
While salespeople may need analysts to be ‘brought over the wall’, since the Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) and NASD rulings in 2003 the wall between research 
and banking is the least permeable, precisely because analysts and bankers have been found 
guilty of the most blatant acts of trespassing.10 A common scenario is as follows: 
 
Investment bankers are going to call a company – like I just did (the speaker is 
referring to putting information together before a phone call to a potential corporate 
client) – and I tell them, ‘We know you are burning cash. You are going to be doing 
some kind of offering before the end of the year. We would like to be the banker on 
the deal’. The CEO will say, ‘You don’t cover me. We have coverage from A, B and 
C but nothing from you’. Other investment bankers might say, ‘OK – we will get you 
coverage. I’ll talk to the analyst and I will get you the coverage’. But what I would say 
is, ‘Here is the contact for the analyst. Have your IR [investor relations] guy call him 
and make a meeting with him’. And hopefully the CEO will call our analyst and say 
that they will be in town. 
 
This scenario is perfectly legal, and yet, I suggest, it is equal to ‘jumping the wall’ because of 
an understanding among all actors of how to play ‘the game’. In such cases, breaching the 
wall’s boundaries involves what Wendy Brown refers to as the ‘theatrical dimension of border 
fortification’ (Brown 2010: 97). Whereas Brown focuses on the role of walls in sovereign 
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governance, here theatricality is practised regarding an existing wall or boundary so as to 
constitute and legitimize it while also signifying its ungovernability.  
In the case of the Chinese wall, one can act as though respecting the integrity of the 
wall while simultaneously bypassing it. A potential client, such as the one quoted above, can 
ask an investment banker for coverage, but an investment banker is not meant to facilitate 
such coverage beyond giving the client the analyst’s name. Yet, to be clear, it is routinely 
expected that company analysts will comply by writing positive reviews of companies that 
pay them fees for other services. An example of how blatant that expectation is was supplied 
by an interlocutor who was present at the exclusive Four Seasons restaurant in New York 
when Conseco CEO Steve Hilbert met Salomon Smith Barney analysts who had recently 
produced a high-profile negative research report on Conseco. During the meeting, Hilbert 
allegedly shouted out, ‘How the fuck could you do this to me? Don't you know I spent $20 
fucking million in fees at your firm last year?!’ (Serwer, 2002). Just as Mitchell argues that 
boundaries do not mark a ‘real edge’ but are ‘effects’ of the state, reflecting other 
arrangements (Mitchell, 1991: 95), so Hilbert’s remark reveals that banking clients see 
Chinese walls as a fiction, an ‘effect’ of regulation that serves only to produce a semblance of 
order, one that lends legitimacy to the system while simultaneously allowing it to be 
subverted. 
Equally, investment bankers may feel entitled to compensation from a corporate client 
that they have invested their efforts in but which has not reciprocated by ‘sending business 
their way’. According to FINRA (2012), research analyst Alka Singh of Rodman and 
Renshaw wrote a disgruntled e-mail to a former colleague stating ‘Some of these people think 
that research is for free’ when the CEO of the mining company she had written a positive 
recommendation on did not include her firm in a $25 million private placement. Her e-mail to 
the CEO solicited a payment from him ‘so that the analyst can at least get something for their 
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effort’ (FINRA, 2012), showing her disregard for the Chinese wall between research and 
investment banking.  
A firm’s success is largely tied to the deal team’s money-making, and ideally to the 
integrity of that team. The deal team’s familiarity with each other, as with all forms of 
sociality, may equally pose risks to the firm as trust builds between team members. This trust 
may potentially transcend loyalties to the firm and inspire some to skate outside the 
parameters of securities law. Any member of this ‘community of practice’ (Lave and Wenger, 
1991:10) might potentially let personal benefit trump loyalty to the team, thus working 
against the firm’s reputation by achieving personal financial success in ways that are not 
necessarily legal. At such moments, participants may not differentiate between or wish to 
curtail variable degrees of financial success as they monetarily benefit the firm regardless. 
When this occurs, individual deal-team members are faced with the moral dilemma of either 
reporting the rogue team member or enacting blindness. When a strategic act of blindness is 
chosen, the performance of ignorance can also be seen as performing the economy (Callon, 
1998; MacKenzie et al., 2007).  
It is worth considering that after multiple experiences of being part of a deal team a 
particular type of sociality ensues. This sociality, I argue, is based on the idealized trust and 
loyalty that underpins the commonly shared interest in ‘making money’. This idea of shared 
interest holds that the more money an individual earns for himself or herself regardless of 
whether it is appropriately earned, the more money the firm makes. This, moreover, is linked 
to two other tensions that I mentioned earlier. First, the convenient fiction that an analyst’s 
success is fully divorced from the firm’s monetary success. Second, that the Chinese wall is in 
place because investment banking is inherently composed of conflicts of interest. Herein lies 
‘the game’: the improvised conditions by which individuals navigate and operationalize their 
own and their firm’s livelihood and well-being. 
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‘The game’: willful blindness and visibility 
Despite legislative tampering, and despite only becoming physical in 2002, Chinese walls 
have been upheld for decades. However, some individuals subvert the walls’ purpose of 
structural blindness and in turn provoke their colleagues to be willfully blind to such acts of 
trespass.  
In conversations with interlocutors it is clear that they participate to varying degrees in 
willful blindness concerning the infringements that ‘others’ make upon the regulatory rules of 
Chinese walls. Yet what is also clear is that the largest concern among some within the 
investment banking community is not that walls are breached, but rather that because of the 
widespread and intimate knowledge of  ‘the game’ among professionals, the walls need not be 
breached to be violated. When a shared understanding of ‘the game’ is in place then the wall 
becomes a fiction. In other words, if a research analyst is approached by a public company 
asking for coverage (a perfectly legal act) – rather than making this request via the firm’s 
investment banking unit – then the analyst might deduce that there is a reason why they are 
being approached and thus provide the requested information. ‘The game’ is intended to have 
positive outcomes for the related networks. As one interlocutor explained: ‘Everyone knows 
what the deal is. The deal is that we have to make money and the firm has to make money. 
There is an understanding which means that you don’t have to break the wall among 
professionals’. This leaves one pondering over how much of a fiction the wall actually is. As 
mentioned earlier, the wall necessarily serves its purpose while also allowing ‘the game’ to 
proceed unnoticed. Indeed, in moments of collapse, the wall reifies its presence as a 
regulatory device of financial governance, similar to the role of collateral as a stabilizer for 
market transactions as described by Riles (2011), while also serving as a shield against these 
very same regulations by appearing to be impenetrable. 
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My research suggests that visibility of ‘the game’ mostly arises when acts of 
trespassing the wall result in financial failure. Both Fan and Singh were heavily fined for 
violating the Chinese wall between research and investment banking. It is not incidental that 
they were caught and that the stocks in question performed poorly, leading to losses for 
investors. The same holds true regarding Blodget and Grubman. As one judge stated in a 
similar case, investment bankers would never have been expected to share the clients’ profits, 
but now they are being held accountable for their losses (Campbell, 2001). Grubman’s 
resignation letter revealed his complicity as part of a broader network: ‘I did my work as an 
analyst within a widely understood framework consistent with industry practice that is now 
being extensively second-guessed’ (Teather, 2002). Together, what these narratives imply is 
that acts of trespass regarding Chinese walls will mostly remain unchallenged in the financial 
industry as long as they do not incur monetary loss. 
Visuality is at the forefront of how knowledge is represented in relation to 
inconvenient truths or issues of secrecy, whether it be creative accounting or acts of trespass 
involving Chinese walls. Vision is a politically charged process because of the ways in which 
it allows individuals to situate themselves within communities of practice (Grasseni 2007, 
2009). Literally and metaphorically, ideas of seeing, learning and knowledge interplay in 
significant ways, and the ‘enskillment of vision’ (Grasseni, 2007) reflects one’s professional 
and workplace ideologies. This is because, as with all settings, inhabitants learn to ‘see’ 
through multi-sensory habitual practices that also include not seeing – or what one might call 
‘skilled blindness’. My interlocutors may tacitly ‘sense’ that someone is trespassing the wall 
based on their knowledge of how the wall is maintained, but they are also aware that there is 
subjectivity in the act of sensing (Swartz, 1965) and that the move from ‘sense’ to ‘sight’ 
involves personal and professional risks. This act of sensing (with ‘sensing’ and ‘knowing’ 
being interchangeable in what people say) not only challenges the straightforward 
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relationships between seeing and knowing but also highlights the way that sensing and seeing 
are distinct forms of visual perception (Rensink, 2004) that produce different forms of 
knowledge and the potential for action. 
Visuality is a critical feature of financial decision-making whereby experts are 
attentive to their trading screens for the purpose of seeing and knowing as well as researching 
and analysing for due diligence or by discussing or socially engaging with a variety of 
professional others. Where knowledge, tacit or explicit, is experienced via multifaceted 
interactions, investment bankers learn by observing and thus prioritizing ‘seeing’ as a primary 
source of knowledge and basis for analysis. Indeed, social-science research on finance 
emphasizes the importance of visual technology in the way that finance is understood, 
experienced and represented (Buenza and Muniesa, 2005; Knorr Cetina and Bruegger, 2002; 
Zaloom, 2003). Speech must be preceded or accompanied by literal or metaphorical sight to 
be effectual. In the case of notorious corporate whistleblowers such as Raymond Dirks 
(Equity Funding) and Cynthia Cooper (WorldCom), ‘seeing’ enabled them to break the 
endemic silence surrounding unorthodox activities whereas ‘not seeing’ would have made 
them complicit.  
When asking investment bankers at my field site why they might not report something 
that they suspected was fraudulent, repeatedly the idioms of ‘seeing’ and ‘not seeing’ came up. 
As one interlocutor put it, ‘I have never seen them do anything even though I can guess what 
is going on’. And without sight there is absolution, making it strategically beneficial not to see. 
Indeed, invisibility, like the alleged ‘invisible hand’, is a market shaper. Despite the real 
effects of willful blindness on companies and financial markets, ‘turning a blind eye’ becomes 
easier to justify when the Chinese wall provides a place to hide behind. Similar to other 
financial structures the wall is upheld and subverted by the individuals who move within and 
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around it, because of these practices, Chinese walls concurrently provide visibility and 




In considering the constitution and breaching of Chinese walls, I suggest that willful blindness 
is a strategy employed in relation to unofficial rules about ‘playing the game’, even if at times 
‘playing the game’ involves sidestepping regulations. Here, the willful blindness towards tacit 
trespassing of Chinese walls is easily aligned with unregulated capitalism because, 
intentionally or not, it supports the unrestrained profits of those who control the networks of 
exchange. In the face of regulation, this form of willful blindness facilitates a broader 
capitalist network that unofficially expects those with ‘a seat at the table’ to conduct 
themselves with care and discretion and not disadvantage others in the network. This is 
implicit in the SEC warning to investors to be wary of stock recommendations made by those 
who work for financial institutions with investment banking arms. The SEC’s caution 
acknowledges how permeable Chinese walls actually are, while also implying that their own 
regulations are not easily enforceable. Such warnings naturalize a tendency towards willful 
blindness. Even though further regulations have been put in place (while many are also being 
removed) and there are additional watchdogs, cautionary SEC warnings about trusting analyst 
reports that cover their own firm’s sticks signal that there is a broad institutional structural 
tendency toward willful blindness. 
Chinese walls not only extend beyond one’s workplace but also one’s work life. 
Regulatory information barriers shape workplace personhood encouraging the 
compartmentalization of employees into types such as ‘the analyst’, ‘the banker’, ‘the capital 
markets person’ and the ‘institutional salesperson’ by virtue of their positioning vis-à-vis 
walls. One interlocutor described about how, at a recent charity dinner, ‘no one was able to 
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speak to anyone else because we were all regulated!’ Meanwhile, a woman analyst explained 
that her daughter had become friendly with the child of someone she is ‘regulated against 
having a relationship with’, stating that being unable to encourage her child’s interactions in 
the ways that a ‘normal parent’ might do was starting to feel awkward. While bar-coded 
security passes flag up individual motion throughout office spaces and electronic surveillance 
systems monitor computer activity and company e-mails, outside the office, all movements 
that ‘cross’ Chinese walls rely fully on self-surveillance. 
What this study shows, however, is that there are legal and illegal ways to cross walls. 
There are ways of crossing walls so skilfully and invisibly that those who do so and the firms 
they work for do not end up in litigation. Individuals choose to trespass or not to trespass. 
However, they may also choose whether or not they take notice of others who do not follow 
the regulations. In discussing the example of ‘deal team’ parameters and the possibility that 
knowledge may be used for personal benefit, I suggested that a team member that suspects 
another of dubious activities is left with a challenge that extends beyond their own recognition 
of the wall: they are faced with a decision of whether or not to report trespassing. This is 
where willful blindness has the most impact: in the way that it leads to silence and 
operationalizes complicity.  
I have discussed how walls can be broken by words, the relations that privilege 
particular socialities of the workplace and the financial industry that allows ordinary verbal 
transgressions to take place. Similar to Holmes’ (2013) account of how central bankers 
descriptions of the economy serve to reconfiguring it, here, investment bankers also explicitly 
create markets through language. If we consider Derrida’s (1976) claim that speech is a form 
of violence and Das’s (2007) account of how cultural grammar makes violence intelligible, 
then focusing on how walls are broken by words – by taking someone ‘over the wall’, by 
telling them of the correct pathway to follow or by less legal verbal instructions – suggests 
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that acts of trespass in relation to financial walls are important sites for ethnographic inquiry. 
When ethical principles are reordered in ways that sanction skilful trespassers, then turning a 
blind eye to inconvenient truths, inadvertently or not, is an act of complicity. Just as words 
break walls, so does the violence of silence. Words and silence contributed toward the violent 
effects of the recent global financial crisis and continue to contribute towards ongoing forms 
of financial violence, such as stockpiling offshore capital, that exacerbate global inequality.  
The sociality of institutional money-making amidst conflicts of interest is challenged 
only when the game goes wrong, showing that not all money is the same: some money is 
skilfully gained and some is not. Remarking on financial markets and capitalism, Stiglitz 
writes that, ‘as an economist, I certainly possessed a healthy degree of trust, trust in the power 
of economic incentives to bend human behaviour toward self-interest’ (Stiglitz, 2009: 49). 
Chinese walls were installed precisely to prevent this bending of self-interest in the face of 
conflicts of interest intrinsic to the composition of financial institutions. The silence that 
surrounds trespassers is key to the use of willful blindness as a purposeful strategy – a 
strategy that is profitable in terms of its ability to foster and reproduce capitalist structures, 
their networks and their leanings towards excess and accumulation. It is often simpler to turn 
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1 The research on which this article is based was carried out over six months between 2015 
and 2017 among employees in the investment divisions of several multinational banks in 
New York and nearly twenty years of past experience in having worked as an investment 
banker. 
2 ‘Turning a blind eye’ originated as a British military strategy of willfully ignoring 
information so as to achieve a desired outcome (Southey 1896). 
3 Alternatively, the compliance officer can be present virtually. 
4 Secondary public offerings are the public sale of stock for an existing publicly traded 
company. 
5 Traders do not have information about why stocks are placed on ‘watch’ and ‘restricted’ 
lists. 
6 At this stage, investment banking will have conducted due diligence on the CMPO and 
produced a ‘bare bones’ prospectus. 
7 Gift exchange is also restricted. 
8  Sell-side analysts provide financial research to the public. Buy-side analysts (i.e. mutual 
fund analysts) conduct research that guides the investment decisions made by their own 
firms. 
9 A road show is a series of presentations made by the company management and the 
investment bankers responsible for the IPO to other broker-dealers, money managers, 
analysts and investors. 
10 NASD rule 2711 states that it is unlawful for research analysts to initiate efforts to solicit 
investment banking business. 
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